SPEAKER 1 0:00:00 Welcome to the Sunday Times Politics Weekly where we explore the big political issues of the moment. I’m Mike Siluma and thanks for joining us. Next month on the 23rd of August, Zimbabweans go to the polls to choose a new president and government. The outcomes of that poll will impact not only on Zimbabwe but on South Africa as well. To look at the prospects ahead for Zimbabwe before and after the election, we join on the Sunday Times Politics Weekly by Professor Ibo Mandaza, who is a prominent Zimbabwean scholar and author, as well as Buta Mabena, who is one of the many Zimbabweans now living in South Africa, representing the Zimbabwean community in South Africa, that organisation. The Republic of South Africa, you may intervene. There’s been several attempts on my life. No attempt on who will win. The president is accused of serious crimes. SPEAKER 2 0:01:06 I know I’m going to become the president of this country. SPEAKER 1 0:01:08 You are going to be the president of South Africa. There’s no confusion. I will cancel rights. Corrupt people do not eat alone. They have a spider web. I’m there. I can lead them. I’m ready to be the president of this country. I now suspend the president. I have warned you. Welcome to the both of you. SPEAKER 2 0:01:29 Thank you so much. SPEAKER 1 0:01:31 Prof, let me start with you. How should we read the forthcoming elections in Zimbabwe? Because from where I’m sitting, we’ve had so many false starts in terms of a possible different outcome to the election. Every time Zimbabwe holds an election. Now, will this one be a game changer or more of the same? SPEAKER 2 0:01:52 I think more of the same. It’s a question of history repeating itself. You’re right to cite the paradox among Zimbabweans. For the last 20 years, every election has been disputed. Every election, pre-election process has been controversial. And yet Zimbabweans flock to their elections, fever pitch, excitement about elections. And as we are approaching, with every look that approaches, it’s clear to some of us that the obstacles and hurdles in the way of a free, fair, and credible election are massive. Just today, you will have heard that court ruling in Blawayo. The 12 CCC candidates cannot stand for elections. Notwithstanding what might have been the administrative competence on the part of the CCC, it’s completely unprecedented that you would have a situation where a month before elections, people have been declared winners without a vote. And in a particular situation where, as it’s become a historic beast, traditional, these are people, Blawayo seats normally go to the opposition, whoever the opposition might be. You have a situation where the ruling party is a painting seats uncontested. It’s incredible. Just shocked. And under normal circumstances, I would say, and I’ve tweeted likewise, that CCC should withdraw from the elections if they lose their appeal, which they’ve done already. It becomes the election of a fascicle, not to mention the enormous problems already attended to this process. From the voters’ role, which Dendyebiti calls a crime scene, to the limitation which is flawed, which Pachedu, one blogger, Pachedu has been blowing holes into it almost daily, to the questionable independence of ZEK, to the questionable independence of the judiciary, all these really make this election in particular, one that is likely to be very, very controversial. SPEAKER 1 0:04:23 And Navacho, you have been watching the situation from across the Limpopo, and you are living with Zimbabwean experts who are here in South Africa. What is the feeling? What’s the view of the election? Well, the biggest challenge with the Zimbabweans, not only in South Africa, but in the diaspora generally, is their lack of participation in the electoral process. You will know that in 2018, in 2016, we signed a petition, a civil society and political parties’ representatives, to say let’s campaign for a diaspora vote. Advocate Gabriel Shumba and others did file a court case in Arar. The judgment was that Zimbabwean parliament must amend the constitution to give right to the diaspora to vote in countries where they are, because the diaspora community plays a critical role, particularly in the economy of Zimbabwe. You will know every time when the Minister of Finance presents his budget, you will see an increase in terms of remittances. So you cannot participate in the economic activity through remittances, but you cannot participate in terms of deciding who should lead Zimbabwe. So that’s a… Oh, you’re saying that you can participate through remittances? Yes, but you have no right to vote, because for you to vote, you have to go to Zimbabwe to cast your vote. So a number of African countries in the South African region do allow their citizens in the diaspora to participate in the electoral process. In the case of Zimbabwe, we still have to travel to Zimbabwe. So you have the challenge of campaigning to get people to go to Zimbabwe to register to vote, whether they do that during holidays, and then to go and cast their votes. We have one situation where Zimbabweans in South Africa and in neighboring countries should participate in the electoral process. Zainab Piaf always argues that they cannot allow a diaspora vote until sanctions are removed, but you have no country in Africa that does impose the sanctions on Zimbabwe. So to the contrary, SADC, in one of its summits in Tanzania, resolved that every 25th of October there should be a campaign around the removal of sanctions. So it is clear that there is no African country or SADC country that has placed the sanctions on Zimbabwe, and we do not understand why we should not participate. Yeah, but what is the mood, you know, and the anticipation or expectation among Zimbabweans in the diaspora? About the election, I mean, are they feeling hopeful? Are they feeling, you know, Professor Mandaza has got a very pessimistic view, you know, not without reason, you know, but I just want to find out, you know, people who are looking from the outside. They share the same sentiments like Prof, that nothing has changed from 2018. You remember, we went to the 2018 elections under the same conditions, and we know what happened. You can count 20 years back as the Prof was saying that the election outcome is always disputed. The opposition will always say they have a mechanism of dealing with the vote rigging, but it is not there. We saw that it was said in 2018, it’s been said now, but we know the outcome. So people in the diaspora do not expect that on the 23rd of October or post the 23rd, you are going to have a new government established in Zimbabwe. It’s going to be a continuation of the government that we have, which therefore speaks to the reconstruction of the Zimbabwean economy because ZANPA for the last 43 years has demonstrated that it has no ability to reconstruct Zimbabwean economy, and you are then going to continue to have an influx of young people into South Africa and neighboring countries, and we know what this influx means in terms of competition for low resources or fewer resources in South Africa and other countries, which then leads to the outbreaks which I’ve seen against migrants. Prof, Navrutua has already gone there. I was going to come to you with the question, but he’s already tabled it. When one looks, I mean ZANPA basically has been in charge since, what, 1980? How concerned do you think its leadership is about the state of the country, whether you’re talking about the spiraling inflation rate, the state of the economy, or the exodus of skills, for example, from the country? What is going on in the – I know that you’re not a psychologist by training, but have you noticed any kind or anything that suggests concern about the state of the country in ZANUPIAF? SPEAKER 2 0:09:18 There’s a sense of helplessness, often couched in rhetoric, rhetoric which wants to flaunt, exaggerate successes, even misplaced successes. Is there a helplessness that has to do more with a state which has become depleted of skills, a state which is far from the kind of state we had in the 80s where there was growing capacity as time went on. So it’s a state which is overwhelmed, in my view, by its own failures. A state which is incapable of reform, neither politically nor economically. And since the coup of 2017, which in my view was the beginning of the end of this regime, it is almost inevitable that this regime is on its way out, and the coup, as I said earlier, is the beginning of that. And I know whatever the outcome of the elections, there is no way that this regime can survive in the form that it did. It’s fatally divided within itself. It’s fatally flawed in terms of the personnel that run it, whether it’s the president, its ministers, it’s just there. It’s just there. And so it’s a matter of time. Historians will reflect one day and say the demise of the Mugabe Nangagwa Turenga regime began in earnest in 2017. And the evidence so far is that they have no capacity to turn things around, neither economically nor politically. We are getting deeper into a crisis. SPEAKER 1 0:11:34 I saw somewhere where you made reference to how, from a political point of view, ZANU-PF is different from many other liberation movements in the way that it perceives the opposition. Do you want to elaborate on that as to what is the difference? SPEAKER 2 0:11:53 Yes, I’ve said this before, that since independence, the attitude of the ZANU-PF and the state has been one to regard the opposition as an enemy to be vanquished, whether it was ZAPU under Joshi Nkomo, ZOOM under Takere, MDC under Tsangirai, and now CCC. There is an embedded and implicit intolerance for opposition. It’s almost as if we have just one party state. And it makes fascicle the idea of democracy. As someone put it the other day, that you have a parliament, a new parliament built just outside Arare, and it has the typical Westminster model, front benches for the ruling party and front benches for the opposition. Now, it’s almost as if ZANU-PF doesn’t want to see anybody in the opposition. And that has been the tendency to win all, you know. Vanquish them to nothing. And it’s only Zimbabwe who is in that mold, in my opinion, put it. You don’t see that in other countries, you know. And yet, the SADC and in particular South Africa, you have leadership, including this Barula guy, bellowing praises for ZANU-PF. It’s very stupid in my view, very short-sighted and ignorant, you know. It reflects very badly on the South Korean leadership, if I may say so. And we would want to tell Barula and his face that he’s being very stupid and short-sighted. SPEAKER 1 0:13:33 I would like us to come back to that point, you know, of what the region and South Africa in particular can do to assist in Zimbabwe. But before we get to that, I wanted us to look at the opposition itself. We’ve just been talking about ZANU-PF and its role in the crisis, probably playing a major role in precipitating the crisis. But what about the opposition, you know? Would you say that the opposition has come to the party in terms of its contribution in changing the situation in Zimbabwe? Or is it just too fragmented? SPEAKER 2 0:14:11 Well, the first thing to say is that, of course, the opposition has been one that has been battered, as I said, since independence. It is little or no room to operate. Right now you can see that CCC, which was MGC before, lost its headquarters, lost its offices. There’s no offices at all. It is by its own admission without the institutions around it and so forth and so on. And all the same, when they’ve been given the opportunity to be party to the state, as was the case during the JNU, they showed a very startling lack of ideas. They haven’t been able, since the opposition came into being, to define an alternative policy framework beyond just highlighting the flaws of the ZANU-PF government. Nothing beyond merely demanding that they get takeover from the ZANU-PF government. So, yeah, you know, for example, that neither ZANU-PF nor CCC have regulatory manifestos. For the first time, you have party and all they’re in for is competition. For ZANU-PF to stay in power and for him, for CCC to take over power. When you reduce the struggle to that level where the other competitor has already got state power, the outcome is well known. It’s inevitable. It’s forgiven for conclusion. SPEAKER 1 0:15:51 And Nabuto, are you seeing the same picture as the prof? Certainly, certainly, because the opposition, in our view, is not building on past victories, because this should be a continuation of the struggle when the workers came together in 1991 to establish the national autocadder under the ban of the National Working People’s Convention to redefine the new agenda for Zimbabwe, to say, how do you complete the liberation of Zimbabwe? We are seeing an opposition currently, as led by Nelson Chamisa, trying to define itself outside the layers of the MTC or what the MTC stood for. If you look into their parliamentary candidates currently, there are new faces, very few, maybe three or four, very few that have been part of the MTC. And there is this attempt to try and distance themselves from the agenda that was set by the MTC. Which, again, then presents its penalty to ZANU-PF, a political penalty, like what happened in Bulawa, where 12 MPs are now set not to contest unless there is going to be an appeal. It’s an opposition that has not come to the table in terms of providing a political administration to run an effective political organization that is able to campaign as grassroots base. The CCC, it has the mass support, but at times you feel that they do not know what to do with the mass support that they have. Hence, all these political planners that, again, ZANU-PF takes advantage of. Then on ZANU-PF, in this election, if we go back to the gold mafia and you check some of their candidates, Nangagua has been mobilizing what one will be calling thugs to be the parliamentary candidates. We saw the invitation of the international former boxing champion to Arar as part of the electoral campaign. So you have people that are part of the looting class that Nangagua now fronts as parliamentary candidates. And you see the massive spending that is there in the campaign of ZANU-PF, whether through crook or hook, which you will not see in the opposition. I was laughing the other day when the ladies in some rural areas were celebrating that they were given some pieces of chicken as part of an election campaign. So our election has now been reduced to some free base. It is not an election that is based on a clear political program to say, how do you reconstruct the economy of Zimbabwe? How do you complete the liberation of Zimbabwe? It is absent in this election. Prof. Jasso, I will come back to you. Some people have, and I think you are among them, have argued that what the country needs is not another election, but a national dialogue. Some people have spoken about Zimbabwe’s Lancaster House moment. Why is that? Are we saying that the electoral route has turned into a cul-de-sac? SPEAKER 2 0:19:20 Yes, repeatedly so, and inevitably so, given the structure of the state, a secular state, in which the ruling party has won, in better commas, the election, every election, through the facilitation of the military and the security system. And it has tended to use elections as a means of legitimizing the illegitimate, in my view, with every election outcome. So we have proposed, since 2016, a group of us, led by Sapis Trust and the Peralta and Pokolosan citizens, for transitional authority, such as that which the Sudanese tried, using our document, in fact, which didn’t work out. But the idea was to get a transitional arrangement to give Zimbabwe a breathing space during which political and economic reforms are undertaken before the next elections, through a transitional government which reflects the various parties in its composition, in terms of affiliation and association, which reflects also the technocratic background that Zimbabwe is well known for, and a small team of people who moved the reform agenda, and in doing so, helps now with transit from a non-democratic system towards an accountable democratic order in which the executive is accountable, the legislature is vibrant, and the judiciary is fiercely independent. That is what we should be doing. We are hoping that if there is a hung parliament, if there is a runoff, that we would try and use the region, when we’ve been in touch with South Africa, as regional powers, people like Gopasanjo and others, to see whether we can have an international conference in September, to try and put on the table this reform agenda, and use eminent persons like Gopasanjo, Motlante, Kukwete in Tanzania, or Uruk in Kenya, to mediate among Zimbabwean civic society, political parties, towards a comprehensive political and economic settlement. We’ve been trying to sell this idea for a long time, but there are no takers, neither in the ruling party nor in the opposition, because they all believe in elections. The opposition believes that if they have elections, they will win. They never want to understand the fact that it is hardly likely that there will be a transfer of power to them, even if they win. So we are hoping that if Kaskwel is allowed to stand, that there will be at least a runoff, which gives us a window of opportunity to bring these moments together, even to preempt the runoff, and say, let’s get together, let’s have a coalition as a form of a kind of transitional government to the next election. SPEAKER 1 0:22:49 Another person, and I’m going to ask your view as well, after the program, another person might say, well, what incentive is there for, I mean, given, particularly given its track record, you know, of repression, you know, of the opposition, what incentive is there, or can there be, for ZANU-PF to agree to such a conversation, or a dialogue, or a conference? SPEAKER 2 0:23:17 In a typical fashion, a transitional thought is usually the Langasta House moment, where the contestants for power, or where the opposing forces, so to speak, have come to the end of the road, a kind of a stalemate, or a worst-case scenario where there’s just outright bloodshed everywhere, such as we have in Sudan, which forces everybody concerned to say, look, let’s find a way forward. That’s what we call the Langasta moment. We are hoping that the elections, if they take place, that there will be this window of opportunity for a Langasta-type moment, during which all parties, including ZANU-PF, will find it prudent to go that route in the interest of their own survival, as individuals in the case, because, as you know, in the Langasta House, which also attended, there was amnesties and amnesty arrangements to avoid revenge and retribution, and so on and so forth. So, basically, we are saying that they suppose, for example, ZANU-PF does not win outright, or that Munangagua loses, which is possible, that that would create a kind of agency, an agency on their part, or something like that. Likewise, we believe that the situation where there’s a lot of complaint about the possibility that if Shamisa wins outright, he might end up behaving just like how ZANU-PF has been behaving. So there’s increasingly a tendency to argue for an all-inclusive kind of dispensation, all inclusive beyond the two parties, it includes civic society and smaller parties. We have some of us been recommending the proportional representation, so that governments in Africa, including Zimbabwe, become more inclusive than this Westminster model, and so ill-suited to our purposes as nation states in the making. SPEAKER 1 0:25:58 And Nabuto, from where you’re sitting, do you agree with the proof that the root of the election is a dead root, basically? That a new way to solve the problem needs to be found? Indeed, because the elections are not going to resolve any challenges that Zimbabwe is faced with, and the question that we’re confronted with is how to just make a deep state through an election. We don’t think that is possible, so you need to have this dialogue so that it becomes inclusive. Zimbabweans participate in it, and the main agenda, in our view, should be building the national democratic economy in Zimbabwe. We said in 2017, ahead of the election, it was just some weeks before the call, that the outcome of an election was going to be disputed, and we’re going to then spend time talking about legitimacy. This is what happened, and this is what is going to happen beyond August 23. So you need to chart a new path to say how to reconstruct Zimbabwe, how to dismantle the deep state, because we do not think that those that are the world military tanks in November will easily give power to the opposition. We don’t think so. So it’s important that we begin a campaign which PROF speaks about to say, is it feasible to have dialogue, dialogue that is going to be supported not only internally in Zimbabwe, but by key regional players. We have a BRICS summit that is coming up in this country in August. Zimbabwe must benefit from the programs of BRICS. We must also use that as an opportunity to say, how do we reconstruct Zimbabwe? How do we position Zimbabwe as a key international player? But you cannot do so when you have an outcome of an election that is disputed. PROF, this brings us to the question of, I mean, you referred to the change that happened in 2017 as a coup. So we presume that the army is still the power behind the throne as it were. Now, what should happen with the role of the Zimbabwean army as things stand now? As Nabuto is saying that, you know, even if we, you know, we’re looking at the possibility of a negotiation, etc., would you see the army being there negotiating or what would happen in a situation like that to the army or with the army? SPEAKER 2 0:28:33 Well, it would be as simple as restoring constitutionalism, curing the coup thereby, and restoring the rule of law as is the case in every country in the region, with the military back in the barracks as is the case in the region. So Zimbabwe is the odd man out, one might say, you know. There’s nothing unusual or unexpected of the army going back to the barracks. And I think it’s feasible, absolutely feasible. I think the rank and file of the army would gladly want to be seen as a professional army in the barracks as their counterparts are in the rest of the region and elsewhere. SPEAKER 1 0:29:16 Mm-hmm. Okay. Just before we conclude, earlier in our conversation, Prof, you touched on the issue of, you mentioned Vila Mbalula specifically, but more broadly, what sort of role might assist the Zimbabwean democratization process from the part of the region, but also from the part of South Africa? I know that South Africa’s involvement in Zimbabwe has been controversial for a long time. Is there a role for South Africa and the region in Zimbabwe or not, maybe? SPEAKER 2 0:29:52 Of course, there can be no solution to the Zimbabwean crisis without South Africa. But on the same vein, it’s important that South Africa leadership becomes more informed about Zimbabwe and not put their hands in the sand and harp on senseless reference to the fraternity of the former liberation movements. Everyone knows, including those of us who are in the liberation movement, that the liberation movements have long served their purpose. And they failed dismally to take over the post-apartheid or post-colonial situation and move it towards an era of economic independence and sustained development. Everyone knows that. They have failed. So why you harp on them, unless you are trying to justify your own flagging fortunes in South Africa? So I think one needs more informed leadership in South Africa and more well informed ANC. And I like to say that dealing with the DERCO, they are more they are much more informed, much up to it. But I’m sad to hear the Imbalula of this world churning out nonsense in the face of such glaring realities as such as we have in Zimbabwe. Having said that, I don’t see any capacity at all in South Africa to move things forward in Zimbabwe. And certainly not without South Africa. South Africa remains a key factor. And we on our part, as part of this conference we are talking about, we are almost pleading that South Africa be involved. Because without South Africa, nothing will move forward. SPEAKER 1 0:31:51 And just lastly, the whole question of sanctions. Have they been useful to anyone? Whether the people who are trying to assist Zimbabwe or to Zimbabweans themselves, you know, to move things in the right direction. And Abhijeet, do you want to come in ahead of the program? Well, we do not think that sanctions have been effective. This is why we are calling for their removal. And of course, the economic collapse is not as a result of sanctions, it is a result of the neoliberal policies that have been advanced by ZANU-PF since 1991. So there is no link between the sanctions and the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy. We need to separate the two. But ZANU-PF is hiding behind the question of sanctions when it fails to deliver on basic services. Prof, the last word to you. What do we do with the question of sanctions? Because it looks like they are parts of the world where people are really almost wedded to the idea of sanctions on Zimbabwe. SPEAKER 2 0:32:51 Yes, my colleague, Justice, it’s a red herring. You know, it’s a red herring. It’s completely secondary to the economic debate on Zimbabwe. Very secondary. I’m not doubting the impact of it indirectly, though that may be, in the sense that Zimbabwe will not be able to enjoy the access to the FDIs and international financial institutions. But again, I repeat, it’s quite secondary to the major issue of the inherent incapacity of the Zimbabwe state to manage its affairs. The inherent corruption right from the top, which has seen Zimbabwe lose billions of dollars over the last 10, 15 years. Estimates are that the Zimbabwe debt, which is now at 18 billion, is nothing compared to the amount of money stashed abroad. People are estimated at 35 to 40 billion dollars stashed abroad by the powerful state actors in Zimbabwe. So that is one of the things that needs to be resolved in the kind of conference we’re talking about. Yes. We need a full disclosure from those that are said to be imposing sanctions. They know where the money is like. You know, I know some years ago I got confidential information that one of the leaders in Zimbabwe had 78 million pounds. Frozen in the UK banks of the British government. So when you confront the British government about it, they deny it. You know, and yet in the same vein, they’ll tell you we have frozen the assets of this person and that person, that person. So isn’t it fair that if you tell the citizens of that country what assets of the leaders you have frozen? More detailed, yeah. God is secret. So it’s the international community, I’m daresay, so-called, is complicit in our misery. SPEAKER 1 0:34:59 Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Unfortunately, we’ve just about run out of time. Thank you very much. Yes, yes. With my guest, Professor Ibo Mandaza, who’s a prominent Zimbabwean scholar and author, as well as Ngabuto Mabena, who is one of many Zimbabweans now living in South Africa. We appreciate your time. Hopefully we will talk again either closer to the election or after the election just to do a, to just reflect, you know, what would have transpired. But we really appreciate your time. SPEAKER 2 0:35:28 Thank you. SPEAKER 1 0:35:29 I’m Mike Siluma. Until next time, do stay safe, stay blessed, and let’s do good for our country. SPEAKER 2 0:35:46 Thank you.